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ABSTRACT
Managerial behavior in organizations is probably affected by
influences from external organizations in the environment. It is
hypothesized that the extent of external influence from specific or-
ganizations will be related to the degree to which the focal organi-
zation is interdependent with the external organization. Data from
141 Israeli managers tends to support the principal hypothesis. Firms
that sell relatively more to the government perceive themselves as
influenced more by governmental demands. Firms that are in relatively
poorer financial condition are influenced more by both the government
and banks. Managers tend to report spending more time with external
organizations to the extent that the firm is interdependent with them.
And managers who tend to rank external, governraentally controlled
factors as being more important to organizational success are more
likely to rank the importance of having political connections as being
more important for a manager.

IMTEROxrANIZATIOr^VI. Ii\'FLURKCK AND MNAGERTAL
ATTII'UUES
The question of whot determines how organizations operate
stands at tlie very center of attempts to develop managerial or
organizational theory. It would be beyond the scope of this paper
to review the various analytical perspectives that have been de-
veloped in an attempt to address the issue of what determines
organizational behavior. We can point out that originally, or-
ganizations tended to be viewed as rational instruments for
achieving some specified objective (Taylor, 1911; Gulick and
Urwick, 1937). Later, it was recognized that organizations are
social systems of interacting persons, and this fact has certain
dysfunctional consequences for bureaucratic operation (Merton,
1940; Gouldner, 1954), and can also be used to analyze some of
the determinants of organizational behavior (Selznick, 1948).
Another line of research has viewed the organization as a loosely
coupled coalition of participants (Cyert and March, 1963), with
the central organizational problem being that of supplying enough
inducements to maintain a viable coalition. Finally, there has
recently been within the organizational writing an increasing
analytical focus on the organization as an open system (Katz and
Kahn, 1966; Thompson, 1967; Parsons, 1956; Perrow, 1970). It is
the purpose of this paper to provide some evidence indicating how
this latter analytical perspective can be useful in analyzing or-
ganizational behavior and the attitudes of managers within organi-
zations .

The Org an \zn t: i ou :> J V r. o blcii i
The organizuLiundl pri)l>](jr,i is that of orgnnizing and con-
trolling, coliecLivc action so ?s to achieve, as effectively as
posr, ible, the yon Is of the ori',jniKfi t ion in tlu''. cnvix-onment in
which it operates. As Thompson and McEwen (1958) have noted,
these goals are dynamic responses to the environment, and Parsons
(1956) has noted that the organization's goals provide a means
of legitimating it in the larger society in which it exists.
Parsons (1960) has distinguished three levels in an organi-
zation. The technical level does the work of the organization,
and is focused toward goal attainment. The administrative level
has the function of integrating the technical level, coordinating
the work, and ensuring the proper administrative machinery exists
so that organizational operations can proceed. The third level
in the organization, the institutional level, has the function
of relating the organization to its environment, and of handling
• interorganizational relations.
That part of the organizational problem that deals with in-
ternal efficiency has been treated most extensively in the organi-
zational and management literature. There has been great con-
cern with what type of supervision is best (Argyle, et al . , 1958;
Vroom, 1964; Katz, et al . , 1951), and concern with the relation-
ship between worker satisfaction and productivity (Brayfield and
Crockett, 1955; Katzell, et al . , 1961; Viteles, 1953. Relatively
less concern has been directed to the relationship between the
organization and its environment. Nevertheless, the experience of

-3-
General Motors (Corutz, 1966) and the automobile industry in
gencrnl, the problcny.s of universities today, and many other
examples illustrate llie impoctance of the institutional function
of legitimating the or^anizat i oa ' s goals cind output in the social
context in v.'hicli it operates, Moreover, in a society which is in-
creasingly organizationally dense (Boulding, 1953), it is likely
that many of the stimuli for managerial behavior come from outside
of the organization, rather than from within.
The Organization and Its Environment
There has been some research that has attempted to trace the
managerial and organizational implications of the environment.
Burns and Stalker (1961) noted how the rapidity of change and the
complexity of the technological environment appeared to determine
whether a mechanical or organic system of management was employed.
Under a mechanical system, appropriate for very stable environments,
there was greater adherence to rules, less group decision making,
and in general, a more bureaucratic management system. The organic
system of management, which was more flexible, seemed to be more
appropriate for rapidly changing environments.
The impact of the environment on organization was also studied
by Woodward (1965), where this time the environment was viewed in
terms of the production technology. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967)
noted how organizations differed along the dimensions of dif-
ferentiation and integration as the rapidity of change in their
environments differed, and furthermore indicated that organizations
that more closely matched the environmental requirements tended to
to be more successful thnn tliose ti\at did not.

Simpson ond Gallfly (1962) examined hoi; differences in the
f;nnis of Lhe org.ai i z..: t i on and pire.ysures from the onv ironmen t af-
fected organizal ional opercition, while Pugh, or al
. (1969) invcsti-
gnted the inierrela L ionsliip of n variety of organizational con-
textual Vijriahlts ijnd variables of orf^ani.za tional structure.
These studier: can all be distinguished by their focus on the
interrelationship betv/een environment and elements of organization
structure. More like the present study, Dill (1958) examined the
impact of the environment on the behavior of managers. In his
study of two Norwegian firms, Dill provided evidence that managerial
behavior was conditioned at least in part by the environment, as
well as by factors internal to the organization.
The present study focuses on the impact on managerial per-
ceptions of their behavior of influences emanating from specific
other organizations in the focal organization's organization-set
(Evan, 1966). This study, then, is different because the environ-
mental components being examined are other organizations, acting
in mechanisms of interorganizational influence, and the effects
being examined are actual differences in managerial behavior and
attitudes.
Interorganizational Influence and Managerial Attitudes
We hypothesize that interorganizational influence arises from
conditions of asymmetric interdependence between organizations. In
turn, interdependence can be productively viewed in a resource-
exchange framework (Levine and White, 1961). We shall argue, then,
that when organizations are interdependent, because of resource
exchange, and when one of these is less dependent than the other
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on the partlculrir exchange relationship, conditions exist which
cnn lead to j nterorgani zat iona] inl liience.
Some examples way help illustrate the types of behavior to
which we are referring. Perrow (1970) reports that it is believed
that General Motors audits tlie accounting records of some of its
smaller suppliers, to make sure that they are not making too much
money on the business they are doing with GM. In this instance,
the small suppliers are selling virtually all of their output to
General Motors, while on the other hand, each supplier comprises
only a minute fraction of the input-system that General Motors
itself uses. Moreover, since there are relatively few automobile
companies, there are few alternatives for the small suppliers in
terms of markets for their output. Thus, the small suppliers are
more dependent upon GM than GM is on them. Consequently, General
Motors can use this asymmetric interdependence to influence the
organizations to sell to them at a relatively lower price.
The antitrust laws are literally filled with proscriptions
that seek to prohibit the use of interorganizational power. Sup-
pliers are not supposed to be able to restrict their distributors'
resale price or sales territory, and tying arrangements and con-
tracts are also illegal. In most of these instances, the supplier
has a large number of distributors, but each distributor can buy
products from one, or only a few suppliers. This leads to asymmetric
interdependence, and to the potential for interorganizational in-
fluence. In the cases just mentioned, society has acted to pro-
hibit the actual exercise of such influence.
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Interor;:;;);ii?aLJon.Tl inf]injnce is .-icLually a vjidespread phe-
nonicnoa, nnd, as a w.rntcr of- fact:, mr.ny aspects of social change
are accovaplished Lhro'.igh this mcchaiiism. Thus, we see the Federal
government at tempt iu^^-, to have firms cliaiige their minority recruit-
ment and liirJng practices; consumer union groups attempt to have
companies chan,';« tiieir product policies; and trade associations
and businesses attempt to influence legislative policies. We are
hypothesizing that interorganizational influence will be observed,
and will be successful, to the extent that there is asymmetric
interdependence between the organizations. Without unequal inter-
dependence, the probability of successfully influencing the or-
ganization is relatively small.
This argument implicitly focuses on the resource exchange
process as being important to the understanding of organizational
behavior. It is thus quite consistent with the perspective of the
organization as an open system, and with the notion that the or-
ganization seeks to survive, for which it requires resources.
Data and the Sample
Interview data were collected by Aharoni (1971) from the
managers of the 141 largest manufacturing plants in Israel. These
data were collected as part of a study of the characteristics of
the Israeli manager. The data collected ranged from background
information on both the mana^^virs and the firm for which he worked
to measures of the manager's attitudes toward a wide variety of
subjects and situations. Tlie study was undertaken for purposes
independent of the test of the hypothesis on interorganizational

-7-
intluLuice wf- liavc iJiroposed, n.-,d Liins wliilc there is undoubtedly
expcriuiciiier and iiitervie^rer bins in the data, this bias is at
least unrelated to the proi^os it ions we will be- testing.
The 1^1 nicnagcrs had titles rant';ing from president to plant
manager, but thity could rfil he considered to be in ge'nerat'manage-
ment, and they were all the chief executives of at least one large
manufacturing facility. The plants had sales ranging from up to
100,000,000 Israeli pounds, with a median value of 11,883,000
pounds. The largest concern had over 75,000 workers. Data on
over 500 variables were gathered in the interview with each man-
ager. Since most of this data does not concern the present study,
we will discuss only those questions that are appropriate to
examining interorganizational influence and the impact on man-
agerial attitudes and perceptions.
One problem with the data, of course, is that it is strictly
self-report, and furthermore, many of the questions tapping man-
agerial discretion and influence are somewhat projective in nature.
The general nature of the questions tapping hov7 much the manager
was influenced by external organizations was probably necessary
because it is highly unlikely, for reasons of self-esteem, that
many managers, in any culture, would admit to being influenced in
a specific situation by particular external organizations. We
therefore infer the influence of external organizations from the
manager's ansx^ers to some general questions about what he would or
would not do. To the extent that there is variation across man-
agers in how they respond, and to the extent that this ariation
c.-ni be accounted for by hypotheses based upon conceptualizations
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of int:erorr;.ini-:-'-vTt ionnl j.nt.erci(-K'i-ido7ico, then wc fuel justified in
prcsonlinr, those rcf.uJis ns i.^cirie, supportive oi our propositions
concerning ini crorganir^ntiour,! influence and mnnagerial behavior,
In f 1 ti en c f'_of_j2})^-Sl}T-'£lll-S!llJ^l— ^ ^^ ^ "^^s
We expect cl:nt t'iie Kreater t!ie interdependence betv^een the
organization and the government, the more influence the government
will have on tlie manager's decisions and his attitudes. Inter-
dependence with the government can derive from at least two situa-
tions. In the first case, we can have the interdependence resulting
from the fact that the firm sells a large percentage of its output
to the government. To the extent that the firm's sales are largely
with the government, the manager of that firm is hypothesized to be
more susceptible to influence from the government, or one of the
ministries
.
A second cause for interdependence with the government is a
relatively weak financial condition. While in the United States
firms are generally expected to work out their own financial dif-
ficulties in Israel, firms in financial trouble can and do turn to
the government for a wide variety of forms of assistance. This
assistance is also available, we might note, to firms not in dif-
ficulty, but the government guaranteed loan would be less of a
necessity to a firm not facing financial limitations. The govern-
ment can guarantee a bank loan to the firm, thereby ensuring that
the firm will obtain the loan. The government can also provide
various forms of incentive payments and tax considerations to the
firm. While such incentives are generally utilized to encourage
exports or to encourage plains to locate in development areas.
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tliey may also be used by the govurnrncnt to assist firms in financial
distress.. In i'.\c Inrjeli e.cono-.T:y
,
governiiient intervention is fre-
quent and expected, even to the point of owning portions of firms,
so that in addition to hanks, Llic government becomes an obvious
source of funds to firm.s Iiaviiig financial problems. Therefore, we
hypothesiise that firms in financial trouble ijill be relatively more
susceptible to influence from the government.
The manager vi7as asked what percentage of his total sales were
made to various organizations or types of organizations. Government
2
organizations include the categories of defense, the Shekera, and
other governmental organizations. These can be totaled to arrive
at a figure indicating the percentage of sales made to all the
various governmental agencies.
One question tapping the extent of government influence con-
cerned investment in a development area. Certain areas in Israel
have been designated by the government as development areas, and
new plant investment is encouraged in these areas. The following
question was asked:
Assume that the management of the firm decided to establish
a new plant. The Ministry of Trade and Industry has sug-
gested that you establish this plant in a certain develop-
ment area. According to your calculations, the return on
investment will be 157„ after tax if you invest in this town,
after taking into account all incentives and government help.
Please circle one of the following: 1. I would invest in
all cases in the development city; 2. I would invest in
the development area if the yield in the canter of the
country is as high as 257o; 3. I would invest if the yield
in the center of the country is 20/!,; 4. I would invest if
the yield in the center of the country is 15%; 5. I would
invest if the yield in the center of the country is less
than 157o; 6. I will invest only if the yield in the center
of the country is loss than 10%; 7. I would never invest in
the development town.
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The Ko.ndnll rnnk-ordcr correlations between tlie percentage
of salv.s to tlie governiiwnt .-jncl the. ant:wer to this question are
displayed in Table 1. Note that nil correlations are in the ex-
pected direction, .ind that they are all statistically significant
at the .035 level or less.
Table i about here
A second question tapping the influence of the government on
managerial decisions vjas as follows:
You are looking for a Vice-President, and are trying to
locate a good man. Two persons were suggested to you.
One of them is liked by a central government personality,
but does not have the optimal qualifications for the job.
The second man has the best qualifications, but his same
government man doesn't like him. Would you 1. Take the
first man; 2. Take the first man only if the job requires
contact with the government; 3. Take the second only if
"the job does not require contact with the government;
4. Take the second man.
The Kendall tau correlation between the answer to this
question and the percentage of sales to defense is significant
at the .05 level. Firms that sell more to defense are more likely
to choose the vice-presidential candidate favored by the government.
The extent of the financial limitations faced by the firm was
assessed partially by the following question:
Do you think the firm is limited in choosing its source
of funds? 1. No; 2. Generally no; 3. Usually yes;
4. Always yes.
The answer to this question, as hypothesized above, correlated
-.112 with the ansx;er to the question on investing in a development
area, a relationship which is significant at the .04 level. The
direction of the correlation means that firms that were more
limited in their financin;^ tended to more frequently be vjilling
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to locate in tlic govcrninonl:-f^:poiisored area. The correlation be-
tween this quusiiioa and the one on choosing the vice-president was
in the expected negative direction, but did not achieve statistical
significance
.
Yet another T?.en3ure oi' the influence of external organizations
on the managers' decisions vv^as obtained from the following question:
Please rank the following bodies according to the amount
of influence they have on your freedom to make decisions.
(The ranking proceeds from 1 for most influence, to 15,
for the least influence.)
The groups include government ministries, shareholders, directors,
workers, customers, suppliers, and competitors. The influence of
the Ministry of Trade and Industry was correlated non-parametrically
-.098 with the extent of financial limitations reported, significant
at the .06 level, and was correlated -.121 with the percentage of
sales made to the Shekem, which is significant at less than the
.03 level. The reported influence of the Ministry of Finance was
also related to the reported financial limitations, with the Kendall
tau value of -.172 being significant at less than the .003 level,
while the influence of the Ministry of Finance was correlated at
less than the .10 level of significance with the percentage of
sales made to defense (Kendall's tau = -.085). Once again, then,
we see demonstrated the relationship between both sales interde-
pendence and financial interdependence and the reporting of in-
creased governmental influence on managerial decisions.
In addition to the interdependence resulting from the sales
distribution of the firm, and the possible interdependence arising
from financial limitations, iliorc is a third concern whicli involves
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tlic owncrtihip of the firm. Comnanies owned largely by foreign
investors feci iliey have a specLnl cssk of legitimating themselves,
or of being cooJ corporate citizens, in any country. We would
therefore expect that the ownership of the firm might pose some
special concerns in de.nling with t!:e environinent , which will be,
perliaps, reflected in the reported influence of the government on
managerial decisions. A question measuring government impact on
managerial decisions was the following:
You have to decide between two alternatives. One al-
ternative will ensure you the sympathy of the senior
government minister; the second one, according to your
best judgment, is better from the point of view of your
firm and does not hinder any interest of the government.
Would you 1. Choose the first alternative; 2. Choose
the second alternative.
The answer to this question was negatively related with the per-
centage of foreign private ownership, with the Kendall tau value
of -.11 being significant at less than the .03 level. This means
that the greater the percentage of foreign ownership in the firm,
the more likely the manager i^'as to choose the alternative favored
by the government.
In contrast to the reports of managers of firms owned by
foreign investors, the percentage of government ownership of the
firm was positively correlated with this question, with the
Kendall tau value of .140 being significant at less than the .01
level. The organization own^d largely by the Israeli government
does not have the societal legitimacy issue to face as strongly,
and hence has managers who tend to choose the second alternative,
the one that is best from the point of view of the organization.
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Firnis ov.iicd \>y locn] investor:". v;ou'ld be expected to fall somewhere
between t1"n."-ye previously presented results, nnd in fact, there was
not a si ;;;'ii Cicant eorrclation betv/oen the percentage of private
local ownersliip and the answer to this question on governmental
impact.
Wc would" expect that firms that vjcre largely owned by the
government would have the power to be more independent of other
governmental bodies, and in fact, we find that there is a predicted
positive correlation of .126 with the influence of the Ministry
of Trade and Industry and the percentage of government ownership
of the organization. This relationship, significant at the .02
level, means that firms that were owned more by the government
ranked the influence pf the Ministry of Trade and Industry
lower. The correlations with the other ministries were not sig-
nificant, however.
The Influence of Banks
We hypothesize that the influence of banks on the decisions
made by the firm would be directly proportional to the extent that
the firm is in poor financial condition. When the opportunities
for financing are limited because the firm is in financial trouble,
banks, as providers of the necessary funds, should be able to exert
relatively more influence. Bank influence, as ascertained in the
question asking which external bodies had the most impact on de-
cisions, was correlated -.135 with the extent of reported financial
limitations, a relationship v/hich is significant at less than the
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.02 level. Tlie direction of r'ne correlation rr.enns that firms that
were more limited in choosing tlieir source of funds ranked banks
relatively more important in influencing their decisions. At the
same time, tiie pc^rv^ontav^e of government ownersliip v7as correlated
.117 with the influence of banks, significant at the .03 level.
This suggests either that under government ownership, financial
conditions in the firm tended to be better, or that the problem
of obtaining financing were reduced because of the connection to
the government.
How Managers Report Spending Their Time
It is to be expected that not only managerial decisions and
attitudes, but also reported time allocations among alternate
activities should be affected by the existence of situations of
interdependence with important external organizations. Correlations
between the reported time spent in dealing with external organi-
zations and those factors that have been postulated as influencing
interdependence further support the conceptualization of these
factors as sources of organizational problems.
The percentage of the time managers report spending with the
government is correlated non-parametrically .102 with the percen-
tage of foreign private ownership in the firm, and .109 with whether
or not the firm believes its sales are being hindered by financial
problems, with both correlations reaching statistical significance
at less than the .04 level. The percentage of time spent with
banks is correlated .170 with whether the firm's Sales are being
hindered by financial constraints, and this correlation is sig-
nificant at the .001 level. The percentage of time spent in
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contact W5 tlT the Ministry of Finance is similai-ly correlated with
the reporLiag of finsncial constraints, with the Kendall tau
value of .123 being significant at the .02 level, while contact
with the Ministry of Tr-idc and Industry was correlated .154 with
the same question, a relationship that is significant at the ,003
level. VJhile correlations of reported tinie spent witli government
ministries are not significantly related to the percentage of sales
made to the government, the sign of the relationships is in the
expected positive direction.
We see, then, that the percentage of time and reported con-
tact with both banks and the principal government economic min-
istries are significantly positively related to the existence of
financial constraints on the firm. These data reinforce our
earlier conclusions that financial problems create increased inter-
dependence between the organization and the banks and the govern-
ment .
Attitudes Toward Exports
'Exports are very important to the Israeli government. Export
incentives are given, and exports are normatively valued in the
Israeli culture. Willingness to export, then, is an attitude that
is strongly desired and encouraged by the government.
The following question was asked:
From the point of view of demand, you can sell all of your
firm's output both in Israel and abroad. Assume that the
rate of profit in the local market is 25% on sales. What
will be the percentage of production that you will sell
abroad under the following profit conditions. Profits
both in Israel and abroad are after taking into account
all of the export incentives. (Profit abroad ranged from
257„ down to 5%) .
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For all profit conditionG, the greater the amount sold abroad, the
more tlie manager could he assumed to be attempting to please the
government. This is because the firm, able to, hypothetically sell
all of its output either in Isrc'Ol or abroad, is generally through-
out the question taking smaller profits by selling more of the
output abroad, compared to selling it at home.
Considering the final category, when the profit on sales
abroad is only 57o, we find that there is a relationship between
the percentage the manager says he will sell abroad and the ex-
pression of sales constraints due to financial limitations, with
the relationship being significant at the .09 level. Furthermore,
the percentage sold abroad is correlated -.111 with the expressed
importance of finance as a factor contributing to managerial suc-
cess, a correlation which is significant at the .03 level. This
indicates that managers facing financial problems are more willing
to do things the government desires. The percentage the manager is
willing to export abroad at reduced profits is correlated -.116
with the importance of export incentives to his decisions, and
this relationship is significant at less than the ,03 level.
Managers in firms in which sales are limited by financial problems,
and managers who feel that export incentives are important for
the firm are more willing to cooperate with the government in
selling more of their output abroad.
The question of how much output the manager was willing to
export did not correlate with the percentage of sales made to the
government, though this result is possibly an effect of the fact
that firms that soil a great deal to the government are not likely
to be making products which are readily exportable.
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Tlio T T.iport.Tnce of Goo d Fo l it.iccTJ. Connections
The fol.loi'/in;:'; question was asked of the respondents:
Please rank the followLn;."^ iactors according to their
actual effect; on tlie advancci.iitat of a manager in Israel.
(One factor is Political Contacts). (The ranking proceeds
from 1 for most import.mt to 7 for least important).
We would hypotliesize that firms in situations of great inter-
dependence with the government would have managers who would tend
to rate political contacts as being relatively more important
than managers of firms who were not as interdependent with the
government. Much like the percentage of time spent with different
external groups, this question provides a measure of cross-vali-
dation on the external influence of the government arising from
various situations, and also indicates the extent to which managers
are responding to this type of external influence.
The Kendall tau value for the correlation between the impor-
tance of political contacts and the percentage of sales made to the
defense sector is -.187, significant at the .003 level. In other
words, the greater the percentage of sales made to defense, the
more important is the ranking of political contacts as a factor
for managerial advancement.
An additional question tapping the perceived importance of
political connections was the following.
Below you have a list of certain personal traits. To
what extent do you think any one of these traits is
important for a good manager. Please indicate those
that you think are 1, Very important; 2. Important;
3. Helpful; 4. Unimportant. (One of the traits
listed was "he has very good connections in the govern-
ment.")

Vic can hypoLhes i /.e that isaswors Lo lhi:i quostion would tend to be
related to the (::-,lem- to wiiicr, tlif maaa^'.er believes that external
factors, over wliicli tlie government has control, are important to
the success of the firm. To tlie extent that the success of the
firm is dependent upon economic variables controlled by the govern-
ment, the manager should express the belief that good political
connections are relatively important for managerial success.
These predictions are supported in the data- The percentage
of exports of the firm is correlated -.116 with this latter ques-
tion, suggesting that the larger the percentage of exports, the
more important good political connections are thought to be, and
this relationship is significant at the .03 level.
When the respondent was asked:
Please rank the following factors according to the
influence they have on your freedom to make decisions.
(One of the factors is customs protection on local
production)
.
we found that this factor was correlated .118 with the importance
of good political connections. The more important this factor was,
the more important political connections were thought to be, in a
relationship that was significant at less than the .03 level.
Finally, the question was asked:
Based on your experience, please rank the following
factors according to those which you think are most
important for the success of the firm's management.
The factors, largely controlled by the government, and the
correlations between their ranking and the question of the im-
portance of having good political connections, are displayed in
Table 2. The importance of the wages policy, while not correlated
with this diiaension of the importance of political connections, was
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Tablc 2 about' l-,ere
correlated .197 i.'ith ihc question of hovj much political contacts
helped in the advancement oi the manager in Israel.
The extent to v/liicii the manager attributes the success of the
firm to factors esscntislly external to the firm, and under the
control of the government, is related to his belief in the im-
portance of good political connections for managerial success
and advancement. Once again we see highlighted the interdependence
between the firm and its external environment, and how this inter-
dependence influences the perceptions and attitudes of the Israeli
managers
.
Conclusion
The data reviewed in this study appear to indicate the impor-
tance of external organizations in influencing the attitudes of
managers in the focal organization under consideration. Inter-
dependence, the resulx of .transactions interdependence, financial
interdependence, or an interdependence growing out of a need to be
socially legitimate, tended to consistently influence the Israeli
managers interviewed to take positions favored by the external
organization with which they were interdependent. The importance
of good political connections was related to the extent the managers
believed that external factors under the control of the government
contributed to their success and advancement. And, the time re-
ported spent with various external organizations was also correlated
with the firm's interdependence with these external agencies.
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The data appear lo point up the need to consider external in-
fluences in seeking to analyze organizational behavior, and also
provide some eviuence of the usefulness of the- concept of inter-
dependence in aiding this consideration.
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F00T1I0TK5
'"At the time the research was done, the exchange rate was 3.5
Israeli pounds per American dollar.
^The Shekem is the equivalent in Israel of the American military
commissary, or PX.
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TaLle 1.
Correlations of Percentage Sales to Various
Govornu:r:ntol ArencicG and VJillingness to
Invest in a Development Area
Government Agency Correlation" Level of Significance
Defense - .110 .034
Shekem - .325 .001
Other government - .160 .004-
Total government - .211 .001
''Kendall rank-order correlations
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Table 2.
Correlations Between iiaportance of Having Good Political
Counact.ions jnd .!:Trn-,ortancc of Factors for the
SaccuL>s of Management
Factors
Indirect taxes
Monetary policy
Export incentives
Incentives to development
areas
Customs
Correlal:ion'> LevelL of Significance
.188 .002
.159 .005
.202
.001
.272 .001
.142 .015
"'Kendall rank-order correlations
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